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1. Introduction 
There are several important arguments in metaethics that rely on explanatory considerations. 
Gilbert Harman has presented a challenge to the existence of moral facts that depends on the 
claim that the best explanation of our moral beliefs does not involve moral facts. The Reliability 
Challenge against moral realism depends on the claim that moral realism is incompatible with 
there being a satisfying explanation of our reliability about moral truths. The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine these and related arguments. In particular, this chapter will discuss four 
kinds of arguments – Harman’s Challenge, evolutionary debunking arguments, irrelevant 
influence arguments, and the Reliability Challenge – understood as arguments against moral 
realism. The main goals of this chapter are (i) to articulate the strongest version of these 
arguments; (ii) to present and assess the central epistemological principles underlying these 
arguments; and (iii) to determine what a realist would have to do to adequately respond to these 
arguments. 
 
2. Robust Moral Realism 
Before we get to the explanatory arguments, it will be useful to first present a strong form of 
non-natural moral realism. I won’t defend this view here (though I am sympathetic to it). Rather, 
I present this view because it makes a natural target for the explanatory arguments discussed 
below. Versions of the arguments may have force against other metaethical views. But the issues 
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involved are delicate, and it is easier to get a sense of the crux of the arguments when they are 
targeted against a strong form of realism. 
 The version of moral realism that will serve as the target of the explanatory arguments 
has seven theses. The first thesis concerns the nature of moral language and thought: 
 
(Cognitivism) Certain sentences and mental representations purport to represent moral 
facts. They are both meaningful and truth-apt (that is, capable of being true or false). 
 
This thesis should be accepted by any moral realist. 
The second thesis is the denial of moral error theory: 
 
(Non-Error Theory) Some attributions of basic moral properties and relations are true. 
 
Moral error theory is sometimes understood to be the claim that all moral sentences are false. But 
this is a mistake. If a moral sentence is false then its negation is true. Instead, moral error theory 
is better understood as the view that sentences that attribute basic moral properties and relations 
are false. For example, if wrongness is a basic moral property, then according to moral error 
theory, any sentence that attributes wrongness to an action will be false, but its negation – and 
the sentence “no action is wrong” – will be true. 
The third thesis is a claim about the independence of the moral: 
 
(Independence) The fundamental moral facts do not depend on us. In particular, they do 




On any plausible realist view, some moral facts depend on facts about our minds, language, or 
social practices. For example, that my friends detest the taste of strawberry ice cream is part of 
why it would be better to bring a tub of vanilla to their party. That certain words and gestures 
have the meanings that they do – which itself depends on complex facts about our social 
practices – is part of why uttering certain sentences or making certain gestures is morally 
problematic. And so on. According to Independence, what are independent of us are the 
fundamental moral facts – those moral facts that (in combination with non-moral facts) 
determine the rest. 
 How should “independent” be understood here? The best way to understand this notion is 
in terms of a kind of explanation (Fine 2012). According to Independence, facts about our minds, 
language, and social practices do not constitutively explain the truth of the fundamental moral 
facts. In other words, the fundamental moral facts do not obtain in virtue of facts about our 
minds, language, or social practices. 
 Independence captures one sense in which morality may be claimed to be objective. The 
fourth thesis captures a different sense in which morality may be claimed to be objective. This is 
the sense on which not every practice of moral assessment is on a par. 
 
(Non-Plenitude) Of the many possible coherent practices of moral assessment, only a few 
are correct. Not all practices are on a par. 
 
This thesis requires some explanation. Consider a view of the metaphysics of morality on which 
there are a vast number of different moral properties. For instance, there are the properties of 
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rightness and wrongness. There are also the properties of rightness* and wrongness*, the 
properties of rightness** and wrongness**, and so forth. Indeed, suppose there are so many 
properties analogous to rightness and wrongness that every coherent practice of assessing actions 
as “right” or “wrong” fits one of these pairs of properties. Suppose, too, that none of the pairs of 
properties is metaphysically privileged over the rest. (This view is loosely analogous to 
plenitudinous Platonism about mathematics, according to which every consistent mathematical 
theory correctly describes some part of mathematical reality (Balaguer 1998).) For instance, on 
this view, if members of some society have a coherent practice of moral assessment that involves 
accepting the claim “causing gratuitous suffering is wrong, but not on Tuesdays”, this claim will 
be true when their word “wrong” is understood to stand for a different property than what our 
word “wrong” stands for. Such a plenitudinous view of morality is compatible with the first four 
theses. But it lacks an important kind of objectivity. The Non-Plenitude thesis is intended to rule 
out this kind of non-objective view. 
 The fifth thesis is the denial of moral naturalism. 
 
(Non-Naturalism) Moral properties and relations are not natural properties and relations. 
 
This is a metaphysical thesis about the nature of moral properties and relations. There are two 
conceptions of the natural that are relevant here. According to one conception, natural properties 
are the kinds of properties that play a role in the natural sciences (along with any properties that 
are reducible to or fully grounded in such properties). According to a second (and potentially 
broader) conception, natural properties are descriptive properties. (See “Metaphysical Relations 
in Metaethics” in this volume for one way to make this precise.) The difference between these 
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two conceptions will not be important in what follows. What will be important is the claim, 
plausible on either conception, that natural phenomena do not have non-natural causes. Given 
this claim, the fifth thesis entails that moral facts do not cause natural phenomena. 
The final two theses concern the status of our moral beliefs: 
 
(Justification) By and large, the moral claims we believe (upon reflection and discussion) 
are epistemically justified. 
 
(Reliability) By and large, the moral claims we believe (upon reflection and discussion) 
are true. Or, at least, we do significantly better than chance would predict. 
 
According to these two theses, we are not epistemologically hopeless about the moral. Many of 
our moral beliefs are justified – they are rational for us to have. Many of our moral beliefs are 
true. Even if our moral beliefs are imperfect, they are correct more often than they would be if 
they were generated at random. 
 These seven theses concern moral language, moral thought, moral metaphysics, and 
moral epistemology. Taken together, they characterize a strong form of moral realism. 
Borrowing a term popularized by David Enoch, in what follows I will use “robust moral realism” 
to stand for this package of views (Enoch 2011). Robust moral realism will serve as the main 





3. Harman’s Challenge 
The first explanatory challenge I will discuss is due to Gilbert Harman. In The Nature of 
Morality, Harman presents a challenge to our belief in the existence of moral facts (Harman 
1977: 3–10). Harman begins by noting a disanalogy between moral and scientific beliefs. 
Consider some scientific observation. To use Harman’s example, consider a physicist observing 
a vapor trail in a cloud chamber and immediately coming to believe that there is a proton over 
there. Harman points out that the best explanation of the physicist’s belief involves the existence 
of a proton. (Roughly: The proton interacted with the vapor in the chamber, causing there to be a 
vapor trail. Photons bounced off the vapor trail and interacted with photoreceptors in the 
physicist’s eye, which led to a pattern of electric impulses in the physicist’s optic nerve … which 
led to the physicist’s belief.) By contrast, consider some “moral observation”. Again to use 
Harman’s example, consider someone who observes children lighting a cat on fire and 
immediately comes to believe that what the children are doing is wrong. Harman suggests that 
the best explanation of the observer’s belief does not involve the existence of moral facts, at least 
not as they are conceived of by the robust moral realist. The explanation of how the observer 
came to have the moral belief only seems to involve facts about the psychology (and culture and 
social background, etc.) of the observer. 
Why does this (apparent) disanalogy pose some kind of problem for robust moral 
realism? There are a few different arguments that one could present that make use of Harman’s 
disanalogy. For instance, one might claim that a belief in an independent truth doesn’t count as a 
piece of knowledge unless the best explanation of how the thinker came to have the belief 
involves the truth in question. (Related principles concerning the nature of knowledge have been 
endorsed by several epistemologists (Goldman 1988: 22; Jenkins 2006: 139).) Given this 
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principle, one might argue that since the best explanation of our moral beliefs does not involve 
moral truths, either (i) the moral truths are not independent of us or (ii) our moral beliefs do not 
count as knowledge. (This argument is broadly analogous to Benacerraf’s problem for Platonism 
about mathematics (Benacerraf 1973).) This argument runs into difficulty, however, since the 
proposed principle is false. One important kind of counterexample concerns knowledge of the 
future. By observing water in a pot on the stove, I can come to know that the water will boil. 
This is so even though the fact that the water will boil doesn’t play a role in the explanation of 
my belief. 
A second argument that could be presented goes as follows: Since moral facts don’t play 
a role in the best explanation of our moral beliefs, it is mysterious how it could be that our moral 
beliefs are by and large true. This casts doubt on our reliability about morality, and provides us 
with reason to give up our moral beliefs. This argument is an important one, and will be 
discussed below. But it is not the challenge that Harman poses. 
To understand Harman’s Challenge, it is helpful to return to the case of protons. Why are 
we justified in believing that protons exist? A plausible answer is that the claim that protons exist 
is part of the best explanation of our observations of the world, including the observation of 
vapor trails in cloud chambers. Our belief that protons exist is justified because the claim that 
protons exist plays an important role in explaining our observations. The same does not seem to 
be true for our belief in moral facts – moral facts do not seem to play any role in explaining our 
observations. Thus, argues Harman, we have reason to worry that our belief that there are moral 
facts is unjustified. 
This line of thought is tied to a general picture of epistemic justification. According to a 
popular view, many of our beliefs are justified on the basis of Inference to the Best Explanation 
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(Lipton 2004). Given some evidence, we are justified in coming to believe a hypothesis if it (i) 
does a sufficiently good job of explaining the evidence and (ii) does a significantly better job of 
explaining the evidence than alternatives. Candidate explanations are better than alternatives 
when they have various explanatory virtues – e.g., they are simpler, less ad hoc, have greater 
predictive power, yield greater understanding, are theoretically fruitful, and so on. Harman’s 
Challenge depends on something like a converse to Inference to the Best Explanation: If certain 
claims do not play a role in the best explanation of our observations, we are not justified in 
believing them. 
Harman’s Challenge thus rests on a general epistemic principle. At a first stab, we can 
state the principle as follows: We are justified in believing that there exist objects of a certain 
kind only if the existence of those objects plays a role in the best explanation of the relevant kind 
of observations. As stated, this principle needs several refinements. One issue is that morality 
doesn’t obviously involve the existence of special moral objects. Rather, morality involves the 
attribution of moral properties and relations – the properties of rightness, wrongness, goodness, 
and badness, and the relations of is-morally-better-than and is-a-moral-reason-for, among others. 
So the epistemic principle needs to be expanded to apply to properties and relations, too. 
A second refinement is that, presumably, for us to be justified in believing in the 
existence of objects, it is not necessary that the objects play a role in explaining our observations 
of those very objects. (And similarly for properties and relations.) It would suffice that they play 
a role in explaining something else, so long as what is explained is part of our total body of 
evidence. Moreover, if a claim is itself part of our total body of evidence, it doesn’t need to do 




A third refinement is that we may be justified in having some beliefs on a basis that 
doesn’t involve Inference to the Best Explanation – for instance, we may be justified on the basis 
of perception or some kind of intuition, or perhaps because the beliefs in question are included in 
our epistemic starting point. (Harman himself endorses the claim that the beliefs included in 
one’s epistemic starting point have a privileged epistemic status (Harman 1995: 189–93).) The 
epistemic principle at issue in Harman’s Challenge is better understood as a principle governing 
the revision of belief. A belief in some claim loses justification when we acquire good reason to 
believe that the claim does not play an appropriate explanatory role. 
Putting this all together, we get the following epistemic principle: 
 
If we are justified in believing that the best explanation of our total body of evidence does 
not involve the existence of a certain kind of object or the exemplification of a certain 
property or relation (and our total body of evidence doesn’t itself entail that the kind of 
object exists or that the property or relation is exemplified) then this defeats any initial 
justification we might have had to believe that the kind of object exists or the property or 
relation is exemplified. 
 
This principle is a mouthful. But it captures a straightforward idea. For us to be justified in 
believing that there are moral facts – that is, facts that attribute basic moral properties – such 
facts had better “earn their keep”. They had better be part of our evidence or part of the picture of 
the world that does the best job of explaining our evidence. 
Given this principle (perhaps with additional refinements), Harman’s Challenge is 
generated by the following line of thought: Our direct evidence about the world does not include 
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moral facts. Moral facts are not part of the best explanation of our moral beliefs. Moral facts are 
not part of the best explanation of any other part of our evidence. So, by the epistemic principle, 
we are not justified in believing in the existence of moral facts. 
As I’ve so far presented it, Harman’s Challenge is a challenge to our justification for 
believing in the existence of moral facts. But it is better to view it as a challenge to robust moral 
realism taken as a package. This is because there are ways to avoid or answer the challenge by 
rejecting realist theses. It is easy to see that the challenge poses no difficulty for a moral error 
theorist or for someone who denies that moral beliefs are justified. What is more interesting is 
that some naturalists are also able to straightforwardly answer the challenge (Harman 1986). 
Consider a view according to which moral properties are reducible to natural properties that do 
explanatory work. For instance, consider a view on which the property of moral rightness just is 
the property of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences. Alternatively, consider a view on 
which the property of moral rightness just is the property of being what would be approved of by 
one’s community if it were fully informed. On such a view, Harman’s Challenge can easily be 
answered: The constituents of the property of moral rightness – e.g., preference, satisfaction, and 
the like – do important explanatory work for us. Since the property of rightness reduces to these 
constituents, it does not need to do any additional explanatory work to belong in our picture of 
the world. Such a reductive view of moral properties may raise further questions – for instance, 
why is it that this natural property (as opposed to some other natural property) plays such an 
important role in our thought and talk? And in answering these further questions, it may be 
helpful to show how the property of moral rightness plays a distinctive explanatory role. But to 
answer Harman’s Challenge, no more is required. 
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This kind of response doesn’t work for all naturalist views. Consider a naturalist view 
according to which moral properties are distinctive natural properties that are not reducible to 
other natural properties. Since moral facts are a new kind of natural fact, to directly answer 
Harman’s Challenge, one would need to show how these natural facts earn their keep. Of course, 
a naturalist is in a better position than a robust realist to show this. This is for two reasons. First, 
adding new natural facts to one’s picture of the world presumably requires less justification than 
adding new facts of a completely novel kind. Second, since the robust realist claims that moral 
facts are not natural facts, such a realist will presumably claim that moral facts cannot play a role 
in the causal explanation of natural phenomena. So they cannot earn their place in our picture of 
the world by providing causal explanations. 
Harman’s Challenge is therefore at its strongest targeted against robust moral realism. 
How might a robust realist respond to this challenge? One strategy is to find an explanatory role 
for moral facts to fill. Indeed, much of the debate over Harman’s Challenge has taken this form, 
though typically on behalf of the non-reductive naturalist. For instance, Nicholas Sturgeon 
provides examples of cases in which we are happy to treat some moral fact as explaining some 
natural facts (Sturgeon 1988: 243–244). Sturgeon’s examples include (i) the fact that Hitler was 
morally depraved helps to explain why Hitler did what he did (e.g., start a world war); and (ii) 
the fact that the institution of slavery was particularly bad in the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe 
and North America helps to explain why widespread opposition to slavery appeared then. 
Sturgeon argues that these examples provide an answer to Harman’s Challenge. 
Sturgeon is right that we are sometimes happy to treat moral facts as explaining natural 
facts. But his examples don’t provide a good avenue of response for the robust realist. One 
difficulty is that, as we have seen, the robust realist claims that moral facts are not natural facts, 
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and so will resist the claim that moral facts can play a role in the causal explanation of natural 
phenomena. Instead, the robust realist will presumably account for Sturgeon’s examples by 
claiming that what does the explanatory work in each of his cases is not a moral fact but 
whatever natural facts the moral fact is correlated with. Strictly speaking, it is not Hitler’s 
depravity that explains his behavior but his racism, paranoia, and megalomania. It is not the 
badness of the institution of slavery that explains the widespread opposition to it, but the fact that 
it caused a great deal of suffering. On this view, when someone presents an apparent moral 
explanation of a natural fact, this is really just an elliptical way of pointing to a natural 
explanation of a natural fact. 
A second issue with this strategy is that it is not enough to answer Harman’s Challenge to 
present apparent examples of moral explanations of natural facts. Rather, it needs to be shown 
that the moral facts are indispensable for explaining the natural facts (Sayre-McCord 1988b). If 
we can explain the natural facts just as well without relying on moral facts, then the moral facts 
are not part of the best explanation of the natural facts – explanations that rely only on natural 
facts are more parsimonious. So Sturgeon’s examples do not suffice to answer Harman’s 
Challenge. 
A different strategy for the robust realist to pursue is to reject the epistemic principle at 
the heart of Harman’s Challenge. It is plausible that we are justified in believing that there are 
objects of a certain kind or that certain properties are exemplified only if the objects or properties 
do some important work for us. But one might think that this work need not be explanatory. 
There are other ways that a belief in moral facts, for example, could earn its keep. 
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The developments of this line of thought of which I am aware are all aimed at arguing for 
the existence of normative – and not strictly moral – facts. Belief in the existence of normative 
facts is then leveraged to help support belief in the existence of moral facts. 
The most well-developed proposal of this kind is due to David Enoch (Enoch 2011: ch. 
3). Enoch suggests that, just as we can be justified in believing in the existence of certain facts 
because they are indispensable to our best explanations, we can also be justified in believing in 
the existence of certain facts because they are indispensable to our deliberations. On Enoch’s 
view, the explanatory project and the deliberative project – the project of deciding what to do – 
are on a par in the sense that thinkers are epistemically justified in holding those beliefs and 
employing those rules of inference that are indispensable for successfully carrying out either one 
of these projects (Enoch and Schechter 2008). Enoch further argues that belief in the existence of 
normative truths is indispensable to the deliberative project. Consider some difficult decision 
between two courses of action. For it to make sense to deliberate about which action to take, one 
has to assume that there is an answer to the question of what one should do. And one has to 
assume that this answer is independent of the deliberative process itself, and more generally, that 
it has the hallmarks of a robustly realist fact. This, Enoch argues, justifies us in believing that 
there are robustly realist normative truths. 
Enoch’s line of argument is appealing, but it faces a number of worries. One issue is that 
engaging in deliberation doesn’t seem to require that one assume that there is an answer to the 
question of what one should do. Rather, it only seems to require that one not assume that there 
isn’t an answer to that question. So the belief that there are normative facts may not be 
deliberatively indispensable. A second issue is that deliberation is a non-epistemic project, so 
indispensability to this project may not yield genuinely epistemic justification. (To avoid this 
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worry, Enoch could move to a different project – for instance, the explanatory project. Enoch 
might claim that it is indispensable to the project of explaining phenomena that we take there to 
be better and worse explanations, which is itself a normative fact. A version of this view has 
been proposed by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (Sayre-McCord 1988b: 178–180).) A third worry is 
that epistemic justification is closely tied to truth, but being indispensable to deliberation is not. 
So deliberative indispensability cannot yield epistemic justification (McPherson and Plunkett 
2015). 
A final strategy available to the robust moral realist is to argue that some moral facts are 
part of our evidence, and so do not need to play an explanatory role for us to be justified in 
believing in them. Harman’s discussion seems to fit with a particular conception of what our 
evidence is – a subject’s evidence consists of claims about the subject’s empirical observations. 
But this is a contentious view of what our evidence consists of. One might argue that our 
evidence includes other claims, too, perhaps including simple logical, mathematical, and moral 
truths. If that’s right, then the moral truths that are part of our evidence don’t need to do any 
explanatory work in order for us for us to be justified in believing them. We may be justified in 
believing in the existence of those moral facts directly, and then gain further justification for 
believing in the existence of the moral facts that help to explain those moral facts, and so on. The 
nature of evidence is a vexed topic in epistemology (Kelly 2014), but this strikes me as a 
promising approach for a robust realist to take. 
 
4. Evolutionary Debunking Arguments 
The second kind of challenge I will discuss is evolutionary debunking arguments against 
morality. There have been many different presentations of evolutionary debunking arguments in 
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the literature (Ruse and Wilson 1986; Joyce 2006; Street 2006). Sometimes these arguments are 
focused on the moral. Other times they are focused on normativity more generally. Sometimes 
these arguments are used to argue for error theory. Other times they are used to argue for a mind-
dependent (or society-dependent) view. 
My discussion will take as its starting point the evolutionary debunking argument 
presented by Sharon Street (Street 2006). This is because Street’s argument is among the most 
sophisticated in the literature, and because focusing on Street’s discussion will be helpful for 
drawing out several lessons. Street’s argument is aimed at realism about normativity in general. 
For simplicity, I will refocus it against realism about morality. Street also claims that her 
argument has force against naturalist as well as non-naturalist views. For simplicity, I’ll 
primarily focus on non-naturalist realism. 
In broad outline, Street’s argument (the “Darwinian Dilemma”) is as follows: Our 
cognitive mechanisms for making moral judgments are the products of evolution by natural 
selection. Indeed, “the forces of natural selection have had a tremendous influence on the 
content” of our moral beliefs (Street 2006: 113). According to robust moral realism, the 
fundamental moral truths are independent of us. However, there are good scientific reasons to 
think that our ancestors were not selected for believing independent moral truths (or for having 
the motivational tendencies that would lead to believing such truths). Rather, they were selected 
for having beliefs (or motivational tendencies) that would provide them with survival and 
reproductive advantages. There are many different possible collections of moral beliefs. It would 
therefore be an astonishing coincidence if our moral beliefs matched the independent moral truth. 
Thus, robust moral realism leads to the conclusion that it is highly likely that our moral beliefs 
are false. This is an unacceptable conclusion. Therefore, robust moral realism is false. 
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One thing to note about this argument is that it aims to show that there is an internal 
tension in the robust realist view. The realist claims that our moral beliefs are by and large true. 
If Street’s line of thought is correct, there is also an argument from premises the realist should 
accept – a Darwinian account of the evolution of our moral capacities as well as Independence 
and other realist theses – to the conclusion that it is likely that our moral beliefs are false. This 
internal tension has epistemic force. It provides realists with reason to give up some part of their 
package of views. Street suggests that the best claim to give up is Independence, and that the 
realist should move to a mind-dependent view. But there are alternatives – one could instead give 
up the claim that our moral beliefs are by and large true, or the claim that moral sentences and 
mental representations purport to represent moral facts, or perhaps some other realist thesis. 
A second thing to note is that Street’s argument is not meant to be a conclusive argument 
against robust moral realism. The premises don’t entail that robust moral realism is false. If the 
argument is successful, rather, it shows that there is strong reason to reject robust realism. This 
reason may, in principle, be outweighed by competing considerations. 
How exactly should Street’s argument be understood? The argument has several moving 
parts. It is not transparent what the crux of the argument is, or how best to characterize the 
epistemic principle underlying it. In what follows, I will discuss ways of trying to explicate 
Street’s argument. 
 
5. Irrelevant Influence Arguments 
A natural suggestion is to assimilate Street’s argument to an “irrelevant influence” argument 
(Vavova 2016). This is an argument that relies on the claim that some of our beliefs were formed 
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in a way that reflects the impact of irrelevant causal influences. This, it is claimed, defeats our 
justification for those beliefs. 
More carefully, the suggestion is to understand the crux of Street’s argument as follows: 
Assuming robust moral realism, we have good reason to believe that our moral beliefs were 
formed in a way that reflects the significant impact of irrelevant factors – factors that are 
disconnected from the truth of the claims in question. (The irrelevant factors are the factors that 
were important in the evolution of our cognitive mechanisms for making moral judgments.) 
According to a general epistemic principle, if under certain background assumptions we have 
good reason to believe that our beliefs about a domain were formed in a way that reflects the 
significant impact of irrelevant factors, this puts pressure on the combination of our beliefs about 
the domain with the background assumptions. Thus, there is an internal tension in the robust 
moral realist’s package of views. 
The problem with this argument is that the “general epistemic principle” it relies upon 
has counterexamples. Many of our beliefs were formed in ways that reflect the significant impact 
of irrelevant factors. For example, the fact that I was bored earlier today led me to surf the 
Internet, which led me to read an article on the red-spotted newt, which led me to come to have 
several new beliefs about the red-spotted newt. But the fact that I was bored is disconnected from 
the truth of claims about newts. Similarly, the fact that I grew up in the United States led me to 
have many beliefs about what various words mean in the English language. But the fact that I 
grew up in the United States is disconnected from the truth of claims about the meaning of those 
words. 
Perhaps these counterexamples can be avoided by somehow restricting the “general 
epistemic principle”. For instance, one might note that the irrelevant influences in my examples 
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led me to acquire evidence about red-spotted newts and about the meanings of words in English. 
This suggests a potential fix: Irrelevant influences are not problematic when they lead to the 
acquisition of evidence. According to this proposal, learning about the significant impact of an 
irrelevant influence only defeats the justification of a belief if one is justified in believing that the 
irrelevant influence did not act via leading one to acquire new evidence that supports the belief. 
The proposed fix, however, doesn’t work. One problem is that learning about an 
irrelevant influence can defeat the justification of one of my beliefs even if the influence led me 
to acquire new evidence – for instance, I might find out that the influence led me to acquire 
evidence in a biased way or to misevaluate the new evidence. A second problem is that learning 
about an irrelevant influence can fail to defeat the justification of one of my beliefs even if the 
influence did not lead to me acquire new evidence – for instance, I might find out that the 
influence prompted me to better evaluate the evidence that I already possessed. Finally, there are 
areas of thought where talk of evidence seems inappropriate. For instance, it is plausible that 
whatever justifies my beliefs in basic logical, mathematical, and conceptual truths is not properly 
described as evidence. (What is my evidence for the claim that 2 is a number or that bachelors 
are unmarried?) If there is a distinction between problematic and unproblematic irrelevant 
influences in these areas of thought, this distinction cannot be drawn by appealing to the notion 
of evidence. 
A different proposed fix is to claim that learning of the significant impact of irrelevant 
influences is problematic only when one has good independent reason to think that the influences 
have likely led one to have false (or unjustified) beliefs. More carefully, the proposed epistemic 
principle is as follows: If, under certain background assumptions, we have good independent 
reason to believe that our beliefs about a domain were formed in a way that makes it likely that 
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they are false (or unjustified), this puts pressure on the combination of our beliefs about the 
domain with the background assumptions. Here, “we have good independent reason” means 
something like “putting aside our beliefs and reasoning about the relevant domain, we have good 
reason”. Versions of this principle have been defended by David Christensen and Adam Elga in 
the context of peer disagreement arguments, and by Miriam Schoenfield and Katia Vavova in the 
context of irrelevant influence arguments (Christensen 2007; Elga 2007; Schoenfield 2014; 
Vavova 2016). To make use of this principle in an argument against robust moral realism, one 
would also have to argue that assuming robust realism, we have good independent reason to 
think that the evolutionary origin of our cognitive mechanisms for making moral judgments 
makes it likely that our moral beliefs are false. 
This proposed fix faces difficulties, too. First, it is not clear exactly how to understand 
“good independent reason” – which beliefs and reasoning are we supposed to put aside, and what 
exactly is it to put these beliefs and reasoning aside? Second, the proposed epistemic principle 
has problematic consequences. Consider the case of perception. Putting aside our perceptual 
beliefs, we have good reason to think that perception is likely to yield false beliefs about our 
environment. After all, there are very many possible perceptual mechanisms that a creature could 
employ, and only a small proportion of them tend to yield true beliefs. (We do, of course, 
possess a psycho-physical explanation of how perception works and an evolutionary explanation 
of how we ended up with a reliable perceptual mechanism that explain how it is that our 
perceptual mechanism yields true beliefs about our environment. But these explanations are 
ultimately justified on perceptual grounds, and so presumably have to be put aside when 
applying the principle.) So, according to a minor generalization of the epistemic principle, there 
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is pressure to give up our perceptual beliefs or some anodyne background assumptions. That 
seems wrong. 
What all of this suggests is that irrelevant influence arguments against robust moral 
realism are problematic. It is not clear how to state a correct general principle concerning the 
epistemic significance of irrelevant influences. (Indeed, I suspect there isn’t such a principle.) 
Even if there is such a principle, it is not clear that it can be used to pose a difficulty for robust 
moral realism. If Street’s argument is to have some force, we had better understand it in a 
different way. 
 
6. The Reliability Challenge 
A better idea is to understand Street’s argument – or the intuitive argument underlying it – not in 
terms of irrelevant influences, but in terms of explanation. What generates the intuitive problem 
for robust moral realism is that, assuming the truth of robust realism, there seems to be no 
satisfying explanation of how our moral beliefs are reliable (Enoch 2011: ch. 7). (This argument 
is analogous to the Benacerraf-Field argument against mathematical Platonism (Field 1989: 25–
30). There are also analogous arguments concerning other areas of thought, including even logic 
(Schechter 2010).) 
Put more carefully, the argument goes as follows: According to robust moral realism, the 
moral claims we believe are by and large true, at least given sufficient reflection and discussion 
(from Reliability). This is a striking fact, one that “cries out” for explanation. In particular, 
explanation is needed of how it is that we have cognitive mechanisms for making moral 
judgments that tend to yield true beliefs. Given robust moral realism, there is no satisfying 
explanation of our reliability that can be provided. That is because our moral beliefs do not 
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constitutively explain the moral facts (from Independence), the moral facts do not causally 
explain our moral beliefs (from Naturalism), and there is no third factor that somehow explains 
both our moral beliefs and the moral facts. According to a general epistemic principle, it is a cost 
of a theory if it treats a striking phenomenon within the scope of the theory as accidental or 
otherwise inexplicable. Thus, there is a tension in the robust moral realist’s overall package of 
views. 
This is a better explication of Street’s argument. It correctly highlights the role that the 
“astonishing coincidence” that we are reliable about the moral plays in generating the problem 
(Bedke 2009). It also relies on a plausible epistemic principle – it is a cost of a theory if it treats a 
striking phenomenon within the scope of the theory as inexplicable. This general principle seems 
central to our practices of theory choice. 
One important feature of this argument is that evolution turns out not to play a role in 
generating the challenge for robust moral realism. The problem for the robust realist does not 
stem from there being some causal story of how we came to have our cognitive mechanisms for 
making moral judgments. Rather, the problem stems from the fact that we seem to lack a 
satisfying explanation of how it is we have reliable cognitive mechanisms for making moral 
judgments. Or, more accurately, the problem stems from the fact that there seems to be 
principled reasons to think there cannot be a satisfying explanation of how we have reliable 
cognitive mechanisms for making moral judgments, at least assuming robust moral realism. 
I think that the fact that evolution does not play a role in this argument is exactly right. 
Pointing to the evolution of our moral capacities is part of what makes Street’s argument so 
arresting. But this is more of a psychological phenomenon than an epistemological one. The 
evolutionary story makes salient a worry the robust moral realist already should have had – 
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namely, that there is no satisfying explanation of how it is that we are reliable about morality. 
One way to see this point is to note that that if we did possess a satisfying explanation of our 
reliability about morality, the evolutionary story of how we came to have our cognitive 
mechanisms for making moral judgments would not seem at all worrisome. A second way to see 
the point is to note that the evolutionary story does not rule out any explanation of our reliability 
about morality compatible with robust moral realism that was not already ruled out by a broadly 
scientific view of the world. So the presence of the evolutionary story does not seem to put any 
pressure on robust moral realism that wasn’t already there. 
To be fair, evolution may have a role to play if the Reliability Challenge is targeted 
against moral naturalism. According to moral naturalism, moral facts are natural facts. So they 
can play a role in causing natural phenomena. At least in principle, we may be able to explain 
our reliability about the moral by claiming that the moral facts caused our moral beliefs. Street’s 
evolutionary account might be seen to put pressure on this sort of approach. If Street’s 
evolutionary account rules out (or renders less plausible) potential naturalist explanations of our 
reliability, it will contribute to generating the problem for moral naturalism. Of course, to see if 
this is really so, one would need to generate specific candidate naturalist explanations of our 
reliability and determine whether Street’s evolutionary account rules them out (or renders them 
less plausible). 
A second important feature of the argument is that it rests on explanatory considerations. 
To answer the Reliability Challenge, one does not need to provide a justification of our moral 
beliefs or of robust moral realism. One doesn’t need to provide new evidence for these claims. 
Rather, what is needed is an explanation of how it is that we are reliable about the moral. In 
principle, this explanation could make use of our moral beliefs or robust moral realism. Since the 
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challenge is an explanatory rather than a justificatory one – and since the challenge is generated 
by an internal tension within the robust realist’s package of views – it is perfectly fine to make 
use of robust realist theses or substantive moral claims in answering the challenge. 
How should we respond to the Reliability Challenge? One option is to reject robust moral 
realism. There are several ways in which this could be done. We could give up the claim that 
moral sentences and mental representations purport to represent moral facts. We could give up 
the claim that we are reliable about the moral. As Street recommends, we could give up the 
Independence thesis and instead claim that we are reliable because the moral truths are 
constitutively explained by our moral beliefs. Alternatively, we could move to a naturalist view 
and claim that we are reliable because our moral beliefs are caused by the moral truths. (Street 
presents arguments against such a response, most notably that if the naturalist explanation relies 
on our substantive views, it will be question-begging (2008: 215–217). As we’ve seen, this isn’t 
obviously correct.) Or, instead, we could move to a plenitudinous view of moral properties. If 
every coherent moral practice fits some set of moral properties, it is easy to explain our 
reliability – no matter our practice, we would be bound to get it right 
Assuming we want to retain robust moral realism, how could we respond to the 
Reliability Challenge? One possible response is to reject the need to answer the challenge. The 
most sophisticated version of this response is due to Justin Clarke-Doane (Clarke-Doane 2015). 
He argues that information can provide a reason to give up beliefs about a domain only if it 
provides reason to doubt the safety or the sensitivity of those beliefs. (Beliefs about a domain 
count as safe just in case we could not easily have had false beliefs about the domain. Beliefs 
about a domain count as sensitive just in case had the truths about the domain been different, we 
would have had correspondingly different beliefs.) Clarke-Doane argues that arguments such as 
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the Reliability Challenge do not provide reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of our moral 
beliefs, and so have no force. Clarke-Doane further argues that we have good reason to think that 
our fundamental moral beliefs are both safe and sensitive. If our fundamental moral beliefs are 
true, they are safe, since the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs show that we could not 
easily have had different fundamental moral beliefs. If our fundamental moral beliefs are true, 
they are necessarily true, and so are automatically sensitive. 
There are several problems with Clarke-Doane’s response. One issue is that we might 
understand the Reliability Challenge as targeting the safety and sensitivity of our moral beliefs. 
If there is no explanation of how it is that we are reliable, this provides reason to think that we 
may not be reliable, which in turn provides reason to think that our beliefs are neither safe nor 
sensitive. A second issue is that there is reason to think that Clarke-Doane’s epistemic principle 
is false. The principle makes the defense of necessarily true beliefs much too easy. There can be 
good arguments against beliefs that thinkers take to be both necessarily true and hard to avoid. If 
his principle were correct, these arguments could always easily be answered. 
A second potential response to the Reliability Challenge is to claim that we are reliable 
about morality because our powers of rational reflection helped us to arrive at the moral truth. 
This proposal faces two difficulties. First, a version of the Reliability Challenge applies to our 
beliefs about what is rational. So this response may simply move the bump under the rug. 
Second, rational reflection requires a starting point – it starts with some initial beliefs and 
(hopefully) improves them. But if our initial moral beliefs are wildly unreliable, even careful 
rational reflection will be unlikely to yield true moral beliefs (Street 2006: 123–124). 
A third proposal is to claim that what explains our reliability involves the nature of moral 
concepts (Cuneo and Shafer-Landau 2014: 424–8). On this view, if one accepts claims that are 
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far enough away from the genuine moral truths, one is no longer thinking or talking about 
morality, but about something else entirely. So there is a limit to how unreliable thinkers can be 
about the moral. There are three problems with this proposal. First, even if there is a limit to how 
unreliable someone can be about morality, one can still be pretty unreliable about the moral. So 
we still need an explanation of how we are as reliable as we (think) we are. Second, if the view is 
not to be a plenitudinous view, practices that are sufficiently far away from the genuine moral 
truths must either correspond to properties that are metaphysically less privileged than genuine 
moral properties or they must not correspond to properties at all. So we still would need an 
explanation of how it is that we ended up with a practice that corresponds to metaphysically 
privileged properties. Third, even if this proposal were to explain our reliability about the moral, 
it would not explain our reliability about what one ought to do in a more general sense (i.e., the 
“plain vanilla” ought). It is implausible that there are significant conceptual constraints built into 
our most general normative concepts, so the analogous strategy would not seem to work for 
explaining our reliability about beliefs involving these concepts. 
In my view, the most plausible direct response to the Reliability Challenge is to present a 
“third-factor” view, according to which there is some factor that explains both the moral truths 
and our moral beliefs (Wielenberg 2010; Enoch 2011: 168–174; Sarksaune 2011). For example, 
according to a (toy) proposal due to Enoch, our ancestors were selected to behave in ways that 
promoted their survival. Natural selection did this in part by encouraging our ancestors to believe 
that it is good to behave in those ways. Moreover, survival is (typically) a good thing, and it is 
(typically) good to act in ways that promote survival. This is part of what explains our reliability 
about what’s good. On this view, facts about what promotes survival causally explain our moral 
beliefs and also constitutively explain the moral facts. One can challenge this specific 
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explanation. And one might worry that this view leaves something left to explain – for instance, 
that what natural selection aims at has a positive normative status. But this kind of view strikes 
me as a plausible avenue to pursue. 
There is an indirect response to the Reliability Challenge also worth mentioning: Robust 
moral realism has “companions in guilt”. This is so in two different senses. First, other domains 
face analogous challenges – including logic, mathematics, modality, conceptual truth, and so on. 
It is implausible that we should give up realism about all of these domains. This suggests that 
there must be some way of responding to the challenge. Second, versions of the Reliability 
Challenge arise for alternatives to robust moral realism. For instance, naturalist realist views are 
subject to the challenge. More interestingly, mind-dependent views of morality may also be 
subject to the challenge. There are very many possible ways in which the moral facts could 
depend on facts about our minds. It is a striking fact that the way that the moral facts actually 
depend on facts about our minds (according to a mind-dependent view) is one where the moral 
truths turn out to by and large match our moral beliefs (as opposed to, for instance, their 
negations). This fact “cries out” for explanation, too. If this is right, then robust moral realism 
doesn’t face a distinctive problem. 
Finally, it is worth noting that, even if it is successful, the Reliability Challenge does not 
conclusively show that robust moral realism is false. It only generates strong reason to reject 
robust moral realism. This reason may, in principle, be outweighed by competing considerations. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Let’s take stock. If what I’ve argued here is correct, there are two pressing explanatory 
challenges facing robust moral realism. According to Harman’s Challenge, for us to be justified 
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in believing in the existence of moral facts, such facts had better be part of the picture of the 
world that does the best job of explaining our evidence. Given robust moral realism, it is difficult 
to see how this could be so. According to the Reliability Challenge, it is a striking fact that we 
are reliable about morality. Given robust moral realism, it is difficult to see how there could be 
an explanation of our reliability. This puts pressure on robust moral realism. (And, perhaps, 
analogous challenges put pressure on alternative metaethical views.) 
 There are plausible lines of response open to the robust moral realist. In response to 
Harman’s Challenge, the robust realist might reject the central epistemic principle generating the 
challenge and claim that moral facts “earn their keep” in some way that does not involve 
explanation. Alternatively, the robust realist might claim that certain moral claims are part of our 
total body of evidence. In response to the Reliability Challenge, the robust realist might claim 
that some “third-factor” view is correct, according to which some factor both constitutively 
explains the moral truths and causally explains our moral beliefs. Alternatively, the robust realist 
might argue that the Reliability Challenge is a challenge facing all plausible views of morality, 
and so does not pose a problem specific to robust realism. 
It is fair to say, though, that it has not been established that these challenges can be 
answered, either when targeted against robust moral realism or when targeted against alternative 
metaethical views. These explanatory challenges are still very much live. 
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